Gesellschaft für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung e.V.

GfeW-Jahrestagung

22.09. - 24.09.2021

in Magdeburg

Programmheft

OTTO VON GUERICKE UNIVERSITÄT MAGDEBURG

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Verfasser und Herausgeber

Otto-von-Guericke-Universität
Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft
Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftspolitik

Postfach 41203, 39106 Magdeburg

WLAN-Schlüssel wird vor Ort mitgeteilt.

FESTUNG MARK
RAUM FÜR KULTUR

Vorwort

Liebe Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmer der GfeW-Tagung 2021,

als „alte Hasen“ können wir auf eine große Anzahl von GfeW-Tagungen zurückblicken, aber eine, bei der die Zahl der Teilnehmenden dreistellig war, ist nicht darunter. Die Tagung in Magdeburg könnte also einen Rekord aufstellen. Der Grund dafür ist offensichtlich. Wir alle sehnen uns danach, endlich wieder persönliche Begegnungen der nicht digitalen Art zu erleben. ZOOM und Co. eröffnen tolle Möglichkeiten – aber die persönliche Begegnung von Mensch zu Mensch können sie nicht ersetzen. Wir haben deshalb alles darangesetzt, die Tagung im Präsenzmodus auszurichten und wir haben versucht, den Begegnungen einen schönen Rahmen zu geben. Wir tagen in historischen Gebäuden und wir hoffen, dass es ein Fest wird. Wir finden, dass das der Situation angemessen wäre. Endlich ein echtes Wiedersehen – das muss man doch feiern!

Für uns ist diese Tagung noch aus einem anderen Grund ein besonderes Ereignis. Wir, der Magdeburger Vorstand der GfeW, ist seit 15 Jahren im Amt und Martin ist seit 11 Jahren Geschäftsführer der GfeW. Auch das ist ein Rekord und wir werden uns dieses Mal nicht zur Wiederwahl stellen. Es ist natürlich kein Zufall, dass unsere letzte GfeW-Tagung in Magdeburg stattfindet. Wir wollten für unsere Abschiedstagung selbst verantwortlich sein und versuchen, unsere Amtszeit mit einem „Heimspiel“ abzurunden. Die Arbeit als Vorstand hat uns Dreien in all den Jahren sehr viel Spaß gemacht. Es war eine tolle Aufgabe, die älteste wissenschaftliche Gemeinschaft experimenteller Ökonominnen und Ökonomen zu führen. Aber irgendwann müssen die „neuen Besen“ ran und wir wünschen uns sehr, dass unsere Zeit im Vorstand mit einer Tagung endet, die allen, die dabei waren, in guter Erinnerung bleibt. Die Voraussetzungen dafür sind gut. Wir haben eine große Zahl prall gefüllter Sessions mit spannenden Vorträgen vor uns und zwei exzellente Keynote-Speaker werden für Highlights sorgen. Das traditionelle gemeinsame Dinner findet im Jugendstilsaal des Herrenkrug Hotels statt und wir werden dort den Heinz Sauermann-Preis zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung vergeben und den neu gewählten Vorstand begrüßen. Machen wir aus allen diesen Zutaten ein richtig schönes Fest der Wissenschaft und der Begegnung!

Joachim Weimann | Karim Sadrieh | Martin Fochmann

Wichtige Orte

Konferenzort

Festung Mark Magdeburg
Hohepfortewall 1
39104 Magdeburg

Zugang über Brücke

Konferenzdinner

Dorint Parkhotel Herrenkrug
Herrenkrug 3
39114 Magdeburg

Foto: Stefan Berger/ Universität Magdeburg

Wichtige Informationen: 3G-Regel

Um diese Veranstaltung so sicher und angenehm wie möglich zu gestalten, findet die 3G-Regelung Anwendung. Das Einhalten der 3G-Regel wird täglich beim Eintritt zur Tagung kontrolliert. Nur wer geimpft, genesen oder getestet ist (tagesaktueller Negativnachweis) darf an der Tagung teilnehmen. Dies bedeutet auch, dass nicht Geimpfte und nicht Genesene, die an allen drei Tagen an der Tagung teilnehmen möchten, drei verschiedene Negativnachweise vorweisen müssen. Ein Selbsttest gilt dabei nicht als Nachweis, allerdings ein Corona-Bürgertest wie ihn beispielsweise Apotheken kostenfrei anbieten (ein PCR-Test ist nicht notwendig). Aus datenschutzrechtlichen Gründen wird auf eine detaillierte Datenaufzeichnung verzichtet, sodass auch Geimpfte oder Genese täglich einen Nachweis beim Einlass zur Tagung kurz vorzeigen müssen. Hierzu reicht beispielsweise ein Nachweis mittels App (z.B. Corona-Warn-App).

Einlass ist jeweils 30 Minuten vor Beginn der Veranstaltung.

Programmübersicht und Zeitplan

Mittwoch, 22. September

ab 13.00 Uhr	Registrierung
13.30 – 13.45 Uhr	Eröffnung im Oberen Gewölbe
13.45 – 15.15 Uhr	Parallel Session 1
15.15 – 15.45 Uhr	Kaffeepause
15.45 – 17.15 Uhr	Parallel Session 2
17.15 – 18.30 Uhr	Mitgliederversammlung im Oberen Gewölbe
ab 18.30 Uhr	Get-together im Hohen Gewölbe

Donnerstag, 23. September

09.00 – 10.15 Uhr	Keynote: Kai Konrad (Max-Planck-Institut München) im Oberen Gewölbe
10.15 – 10.45 Uhr	Kaffeepause
10.45 – 12.15 Uhr	Parallel Session 3
12.15 – 13.15 Uhr	Mittagspause im Hohen Gewölbe
13.15 – 14.45 Uhr	Parallel Session 4
14.45 – 15.15 Uhr	Kaffeepause
15.15 – 16.45 Uhr	Parallel Session 5
16.45 – 17.00 Uhr	Kaffeepause
17.00 – 18.30 Uhr	Parallel Session 6
ab 19.30 Uhr	Konferenzdinner im Dorint Parkhotel Herrenkrug

Freitag, 24. September

09.00 – 10.30 Uhr	Parallel Session 7
10.30 – 11.00 Uhr	Kaffeepause
11.00 – 12.15 Uhr	Keynote: Martin Kocher (Bundesarbeitsminister Österreich) im Oberen Gewölbe
12.15 – 12.30 Uhr	Verabschiedung und kleiner Lunch im Oberen Gewölbe

Keynotes

23.09.2021, 09.00—10.15 Uhr im Oberen Gewölbe

Kai Konrad, Max-Planck-Institut München:

Theorie und Experiment in der Ökonomik—eine subjektive Betrachtung

Die Entwicklung der experimentellen Ökonomik und die damit parallel eingetretene behavioristische Revolution zum Ende des 20sten Jahrhunderts waren zusammengenommen eine "disruptive Innovation" in der wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Forschung. Diese Entwicklungen haben die traditionelle neoklassische Wirtschaftstheorie und die theoretische Wirtschaftspolitik frontal attackiert und als gesichert geltende Erkenntnisse in Frage gestellt. Es galt zu klären, welche erkenntnistheoretische Rolle der traditionellen wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Gleichgewichtsanalyse künftig zukommt, bzw. welche Rolle eine auf paretianische Wohlfahrtstheorie basierende theoretische Wirtschaftspolitik künftig noch haben kann. Der zunächst daraus erwachsene Methodenstreit wurde sehr heftig ausgetragen. Aus dem anfänglichen Gegeneinander ist inzwischen nicht nur ein Status friedlicher Koexistenz hervorgegangen.
In vielfältiger Weise hat sich ein konstruktives und synergetisches methodisches Miteinander entwickelt. Der Vortrag zeichnet diese Entwicklungen anhand von persönlichen Erfahrungen und einigen Beispielen nach.

24.09.2021, 11.00—12.15 Uhr im Oberen Gewölbe

Martin Kocher, Bundearbeitsminister Österreich:

Verhaltensökonomik in der Politik: Evidenzbasierung und politische Praxis

Übersicht Parallel Sessions

Parallel Session	Datum	Zeit	Oberes Gewölbe	Kaminzimmer	Kulturwerkstatt	Königin-Luise-Zimmer
1	22.09.	13:45	Real Effort	Discrimination	Climate	Heterogeneity
2	22.09.	15.45	Social Norms	Gender	Health	Belief
3	23.09.	10:45	Collective Decision Making	Compliance	Covid-19	Communication
4	23.09.	13:15	Group Behavior	Incentives	Fairness & Work	Prisoner's Dilemma
5	23.09.	15:15	Labor Session I	Algorithm Aversion	Reputation	Markets
6	23.09.	17:00	Labor Session II	Sustainability & Norms	Experimental Methods	Information Asymmetry
7	24.09.	09:00	Behavioral Finance	Field Experiments & Selten's Horse	Leadership	Norms & Biases

Mittwoch, 22. September 2021

13.45 - 15.15 Uhr: Parallel Session 1

Oberes Gewölbe	**Real Effort**	*Testing UBI in a lab-in-the-field experiment: Do unconditional endowments influence the performance and bargain power on real effort tasks?*	Frau Blanca Tena Estrada (Universität Kassel)
		Inspiration and innovation	Frau Marina Schröder (Universität Hannover)
		Social preferences and rating biases in subjective performance evaluations	Herr David Kusterer* (Universität Köln)

Kaminzimmer	**Discrimination**	*The impact of discriminatory rule setting on individual rule compliance*	Herr Joschka Waibel (IWH)
		Markes reduce discrimination	Herr Fabian Paetzel (Helmut-Schmidt-Universität Hamburg)
		Can we enhance gender equality by withholding information?	Frau Nathalie Römer* (Universität Hannover)

Kulturwerkstatt	**Climate**	*Combating climate change: Is the option to exploit a public good a barrier for reaching critical thresholds? Experimental evidence*	Herr Janis Cloos (Technische Universität Clausthal)
		A model united nations experiment on climate negotiations	Frau Elisa Hofmann (Universität Jena)
		How to ratchet up? An experiment on effective ratcheting in social dilemma situations	Herr Bodo Sturm* (HTWK Leipzig)

Königin-Luise Zimmer	**Heterogeneity**	*The futile search for the average subject: The jaggedness principle applies to economic experiments*	Herr Björn Frank (Universität Kassel)
		The effect of heterogeneous groups on public goods contributions	Herr André Machwart (Universität Würzburg)
		Labor market choices of migrants and redistributive policies	Frau Kerstin Mitterbacher* (Universität Graz)

*Session Chair

Mittwoch, 22. September 2021

15.45 - 17.15 Uhr: Parallel Session 2

Raum	Thema	Vortrag	Referent/in
Oberes Gewölbe	**Social Norms**	*Fig-leaves in pro-social choice*	Herr Bernd Irlenbusch (Universität Köln)
		Gender differences across economic games: Norms, expectations, and behavior	Frau Bettina Rockenbach (Universität Köln)
		Regional differences in social preferences and beliefs – Evidence from an interactive online experiment in Russia	Frau Heike Hennig-Schmidt* (Universität Bonn)

Raum	Thema	Vortrag	Referent/in
Kaminzimmer	**Gender**	*Under pressure: Heterogeneity and the support of neediness*	Frau Ann-Katrin Kienle (FH Graubünden)
		Gender differences in bargaining - Experimental evidence	Herr Hannes Rau (Karlsruher Institut für Technologie, KIT)
		The dark side of preferential treatment	Herr Maxim Ott* (Universität Ulm)

Raum	Thema	Vortrag	Referent/in
Kulturwerkstatt	**Health**	*On the potential of promoting healthy behavior with repeated deposit contracts*	Herr Stefan Klößner (Universität Vechta)
		Walk the extra mile! Assessing motivational tools to promote physical activity	Herr Maximilian Hiller (Universität Vechta)
		The effects of environmental information and observability on food choice	Frau Eva Weingärtner* (Universität Kassel)

Raum	Thema	Vortrag	Referent/in
Königin-Luise Zimmer	**Belief**	*Motivated belief updating and rationalization of information*	Herr Christoph Drobner (Technische Universität München)
		Which expectations to follow: the impact of first- and second-order beliefs on strategy choices in a stag hunt game	Herr Thomas Neumann (Universität Magdeburg)
		A workhorse design for macroeconomic dynamics: First experimental evidence on a sequential coin game	Herr Johann Graf Lambsdorff* (Universität Passau)

*Session Chair

Donnerstag, 23. September 2021

10.45 - 12.15 Uhr: Parallel Session 3

Oberes Gewölbe	**Collective Decision Making**	*Attribution of responsibility: Reward and punishment in an eye-tracking experiment*	Frau Regina Anselm (Universität Konstanz)
		Attribution of responsibility in sequential decision making	Frau Janina Kraus (Helmut-Schmidt-Universität Hamburg)
		Inequality, life expectancy, and the intragenerational redistribution puzzle - Some experimental evidence	Frau Christine Meemann* (Helmut-Schmidt-Universität Hamburg)

Kaminzimmer	**Compliance**	*International anti-corruption laws and local social norms*	Herr Marcus Giattamai (Bard College Berlin)
		Measuring individual preferences for truth-telling	Frau Susanna Grundmann (Universität Köln)
		The bright side of tax evasion	Herr Wadislaw Mill* (Universität Mannheim)

Kulturwerkstatt	**Covid-19**	*What strikes the eye: How point-of-use reminders can increase compliance with COVID-19 measures*	Frau Anna-Corinna Kulle (Universität Bern)
		My peers want me to stop drinking! Evidence on active peer pressure in an online experiment during COVID-19 restrictions	Herr Bernd Leisen (Universität Vechta)
		Coalition formation in a third-party social dilemma	Herr Tassilo Sobotta* (Universität Halle-Wittenberg)

Königin-Luise Zimmer	**Communication**	*Choosing a victim you know – the ambiguous effect of communication on the mobbing game*	Frau Alexandra Seidel (Universität Magdeburg)
		Does Communicating within a Team Influence Individuals' Reasoning and Decisions?	Herr Kevin Grubiak (Universität Passau)
		Would I lie to you? How interaction with chatbots induces dishonesty	Frau Aline Waeber* (Universität St. Gallen)

*Session Chair

Donnerstag, 23. September 2021

13.15 - 14.45 Uhr: Parallel Session 4

Oberes Gewölbe	**Group Behavior**	*Reconciliation after inter-group conflict: Testing different forms of contact in the lab*	Frau Katharina Werner (Universität Passau)
		Willingness of individuals and groups to intervene in autonomous decision-making	Herr Felix Kölle* (Universität Köln)

Kaminzimmer	**Incentives**	*Incentives to breach and compensation*	Herr Sven Hoeppner (Charles University Prague, FU Berlin)
		You get what you pay for – The effect of incentives on quality and quantity in an experimental real-effort task	Herr Thomas Lauer (Universität Erfurt)
		The motivational effect of detailed volunteer certificates – Evidence from a field experiment on intergenerational cooperation	Herr Devin Kwasniok* (Universität Vechta)

Kulturwerkstatt	**Fairness & Work**	*Managing wages: Fairness norms of low- and high-performing team members*	Herr Florian Sachs (Technische Universität München)
		Shallow meritocracy: An experiment on fairness views	Herr Peter Andre (Universität Bonn)
		Linking nominal wages to unemployment through fairness concerns: Experimental evidence	Frau Cornelia Strauss* (Universität Giessen)

Königin-Luise Zimmer	**Prisoner's Dilemma**	*The impact of monitoring of cooperation behavior and decisions on group membership extension – evidence from public good experiments*	Frau Katja Tilkes (RTWH Aachen)
		Institutional change in the infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma	Herr Stefan Traub (Helmut-Schmidt-Universität Hamburg)
		Predicting voluntary contributions by 'revealed-preference nash equilibrium'	Herr Irenaeus Wolff* (TWI, Universität Konstanz)

*Session Chair

Donnerstag, 23. September 2021

15.15 - 16.45 Uhr: Parallel Session 5

Raum	Session	Vortrag	Referent
Oberes Gewölbe	**Labor Session I**	*FAIRe Forschungsprozesse in den Verhaltenswissenschaften*	Herr Thomas Lauer* (Universität Erfurt)
		Die Zukunft der experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung im Labor - Eine trübe Aussicht und ein (möglicher) Rettungsplan	Herr Abdolkarim Sadrieh (Universität Magdeburg)
		Laborexperimente unter Pandemiebedingungen	Herr Olaf Bock (Universität Hamburg)

Raum	Session	Vortrag	Referent
Kaminzimmer	**Algorithm Aversion**	*Die Tragik der Algorithm Aversion*	Herr Ibrahim Filiz (Ostfalia Hochschule)
		Reduzierung der Algorithm Aversion durch Erfahrung	Herr Jan Judek (Universität Göttingen)
		Gestaltungswille und Algorithm Aversion – Die Auswirkungen der Einflussnahme im Prozess der algorithmischen Entscheidungsfindung auf die Algorithm Aversion	Herr Marco Lorenz* (Universität Göttingen)

Raum	Session	Vortrag	Referent
Kulturwerkstatt	**Reputation**	*Beeinflussung von Firmenreputation durch Sicherheitsbestand – eine experimentelle Untersuchung*	Herr Markus Lüttenberg (Karlsruher Institut für Technologie, KIT)
		You lie? I lie? How social norms and reputational concerns affect honesty	Herr Timo Promann (Universität Hamburg)
		The impact of fake reviews on reputation systems and efficiency	Herr Jan-Philipp Krügel* (Helmut-Schmidt-Universität Hamburg)

Raum	Session	Vortrag	Referent
Königin-Luise Zimmer	**Markets**	*A large-scale reproduction of the CDA a la Vernon Smith*	Herr Heinrich Nax (ETH Zürich)
		Bargaining under the threat of a nuclear option	Frau Franziska Heinicke (Universität Mannheim)
		Anti-competitive effects of partial cross-ownership: experimental evidence	Herr Manfred Königstein* (Universität Erfurt)

*Session Chair

Donnerstag, 23. September 2021

17.00 - 18.30 Uhr: Parallel Session 6

Oberes Gewölbe	**Labor Session II**	*Privatsphäre und Datenschutz in Online-Experimenten*	Herr Max Großmann (Universität Köln)
		Experimente in der virtuellen Realität: Vorteile und Herausforderungen	Herr Özgür Gürerk (Universität Erfurt)
		z-Tree 5: Neue Features und erste Erfahrungen	Frau Regina Anselm*, Herr Irenaeus Wolff* (TWI, Universität Konstanz)

Kaminzimmer	**Sustainability & Norms**	*Why do subsidies work? Field experimental evidence from subsidizing energy efficiency*	Frau Madeline Werthschulte (ZEW)
		Effects and interactions of labels' color scheme and the individual difference variable lay rationalism on pro-environmental choices	Herr Paul Bengart (Universität Magdeburg)
		Alone at home: The impact of social distancing on norm-consistent behavior	Frau Sabrina Jeworrek* (IWH, Universität Magdeburg)

Kulturwerkstatt	**Experimental Methods**	*Testing the accuracy of the Becker-DeGroot-Marshak method: A note*	Herr Maximilian Späth (Universität Potsdam)
		How to choose a sample - A comparison of subject pools for economic online experiments	Frau Claudia Bionissek*, Herr Dirk Betz* (Universität Erfurt)

Königin-Luise Zimmer	**Information Asymmetry**	*Increasing consumer surplus through a novel product testing mechanism*	Frau Ulrike Vollstaedt (Universität Magdeburg)
		Privacy decision-making in digital markets: Eliciting individuals' preferences for transparency	Herr Nikolai Sachs* (Universität Passau)

*Session Chair

Freitag, 24. September 2021

09.00 - 10.30 Uhr: Parallel Session 7

Oberes Gewölbe	**Behavioral Finance**	*Stock price level effect*	Herr Sascha Füllbrunn (Radboud Universiteit)
		Social interactions and financial decision-making	Herr Matthias Pelster (Universität Paderborn)
		On the basis of (mis)trust? Spousal trust and trustworthiness in household decision making: Experimental evidence from India	Frau Henrike Sternberg* (Technische Universität München)

Kaminzimmer	**Field Experiments & Selten's Horse**	*#30-Day Reading Challenge*	Frau Nicole Middendorf (Universität Vechta)
		Gender differences in parental investment decisions in rural india	Frau Liza von Grafenstein (ICAS:MP)
		Taming Selten's Horse with Impulse Response	Herr Tibor Neugebauer* (University of Luxembourg)

Kulturwerkstatt	**Leadership**	*Commitment as a double-edged sword: Organizational commitment influences norm effects on unethical behavior*	Herr Sebastian Oelrich (Universität Magdeburg)
		Leader legitimacy and team performance	Herr Özgür Gürerk (Universität Erfurt)
		Real-time monitoring at the workplace	Herr Lucas Braun* (RTWH Aachen)

Königin-Luise Zimmer	**Norms & Biases**	*The impact of norms and losses in dictator games*	Frau Sabrina Kierspel (Universität Magdeburg)
		Big effects require big causes – Testing proportionality bias in the lab	Herr Dmitri Bershadskyy (Universität Magdeburg)
		How do people discount over spatial distance?	Herr Niklas Ziemann* (Universität Potsdam)

*Session Chair

Zusammenfassung der Vorträge

Parallel Session 1: Real Effort

Blanca Tena Estrada, Nhat Luong

Testing UBI in a lab-in-the-field experiment: Do unconditional endowments influence the performance and bargain power on real effort tasks?

The universal basic income is a widely discussed and researched, although not yet established, redistribution system. Multiple empirical studies have analysed how it would impact labour supply, none of them without flaws. Concerning field experiments, they are constraint in the duration and the population targeted, hence its overall influence is not observed. Meanwhile, lab experiments have only been performed with university students. For the poor, the UBI would translate into a guaranteed income floor, which from an economic theory perspective is a gain of bargaining power as well as a disincentive to work. To assess these aspects, we conducted a one sequence lab-in-the field experiment with visitors of a State Employment Service office in Spain. Participants were either provided with an initial endowment, framed under the logic of the cooperation condition of UBI (UBI) or as a participation fee (FEE), or without it (NONUBI). Subsequently, they were faced with a real effort task from which they could earn money. We find a statistical difference between the earnings on the task from those under the FEE and the UBI treatments.

Bernd Irlenbusch, Katharina Laske, **Marina Schröder**

Inspiration and innovation

We analyze the effect of inspiration on creative idea generation. In a real-effort word generation task, participants are instructed to illustrate words using a given set of materials. The aim is to generate original words (i.e., words that are not illustrated by other participants) that are of high quality (i.e., that can be recognized by third-party raters). Between treatments, we vary whether participants are provided with inspiration in form of viewing previous successful creative ideas before generating their own ideas (inspiration treatment) or not (control treatment). We find that inspiration does not have an impact on average originality or average quality of creative ideas. However, ideas from the inspiration treatment appear to be more similar to the inspirational ideas as compared to those ideas generated in the control treatment.

David Kusterer, Dirk Sliwka

Social preferences and rating biases in subjective performance evaluations

We study the determinants of biases in subjective performance evaluations in an MTurk experiment. In the experiment subjects in the role of workers work on a real effort task. Subjects in the role of supervisors observe subsamples of the workers' output and assess their performance. We conduct 6 experimental treatments vary- ing (i) whether workers' pay depends on the performance evaluation (ii) whether supervisors are paid for the accuracy of their evaluations and (iii) the precision of the information available to supervisors. In line with a simple formal model of optimal evaluations we find that ratings are more lenient and less accurate when they deter- mine bonus payments and rewards for accuracy reduce leniency. When supervisors have access to more detailed performance information their ratings vary to a stronger extent with observed performance. In contrast to the model's prediction we do not find that more precise information leads to more variance in ratings. Moreover, more prosocial supervisors do not provide more lenient ratings but invest more time in the rating task and tend to achieve a higher rating accuracy.

Parallel Session 1: Discrimination

Joschka Waibel

The impact of discriminatory rule setting on individual rule compliance

The willingness to comply with rules is a crucial prerequisite for the functioning of a society. In this paper, I investigate whether discriminatory rule imposition across otherwise equal group members affects the willingness to comply with a given costly rule. In the experiment, participants are requested to reveal costly information they gain from privately tossing a coin while some participants enjoy explicit and exclusive rule privileges. The results show excessive misreporting and no differences between groups facing discriminatory and non- discriminatory rule imposition. Priorly induced group identities do not change the results. I discuss potential reasons for the null result and highlight interesting implications for future research.

Daniel Müller, **Fabian Paetzel**

Markets reduce discrimination

This paper studies the ability of markets to alleviate taste-based discrimination in a laboratory experiment. We find that markets significantly reduce discrimination relative to individual choice situations with the same payoff structure and the same social group membership of the trading partner. We identify three main mechanisms behind this effect. First, the price of prejudice matters in both situations, but significantly more so in

Third, markets diminish egalitarian preferences. Passive subjects correctly anticipate the main effect. We confirm the main treatment effect in an online experiment with natural groups.

Nathalie Römer, Marina Schröder

Can we enhance gender equality by withholding information?

We study whether promotions of own work are a potential source of gender differences in work contexts. In this experimental study, innovators generate creative ideas and provide written promotions for their ideas. The success of innovators depends on a choice taken by a third party supporter, who is incentivized to support ideas based on their quality. Between treatments, we vary the information provided to supporters. Specifically, we vary whether or not supporters see the written promotions, whether or not they can see the ideas and whether or not the gender of the innovator is revealed to the supporter. We show that informing supporters about the innovator's gender does not enhance decision quality but can lead to gender discrimination . Revealing ideas, i.e., providing an unbiased quality signal, increases decision quality without inducing gender discrimination . For promotions of own ideas, we reveal a trade-off. Providing promotions can increase decision quality, but also induce or enhances gender differences in support received. While improvements in decision quality can be mitigated whenever other performance signals are available, the effect of promotions on the gender bias persists even when other performance measures are available . Our results provide valuable insights into the design of decision procedures and the relation of decision design and diversity.

Parallel Session 1: Climate

Janis Cloos, Matthias Greiff

Combating climate change: Is the option to exploit a public good a barrier for reaching critical thresholds? Experimental evidence

This article studies cooperation dynamics in a threshold climate change experiment in which participants cannot just contribute to a public good but also exploit it. In several related experimental studies on climate change, participants act as a group and can invest money in a collective group account over a fixed number of rounds. If the group account is below a threshold after the last round, the group members usually lose a large proportion of their potential assets. However, since in the real world, agents can not only invest in public goods but also exploit them, our experiment expands participants' action set to the negative domain. We induce endowment heterogeneity by simulating the contribution decisions in the first rounds of the experiment and vary the loss rate between treatments. Our results show no significant differences between give and give-take treatments. Consistent with the results of previous studies, we find that with a lower loss rate,

Elisa Hofmann, Lucas Kyriacou, Klaus M. Schmidt

A model united nations experiment on climate negotiations

Weitzman (2014) proposed that focusing international climate negotiations on a uniform carbon price is more effective than Paris style negotiations in achieving ambitious climate action. We put this hypothesis to an experimental test by simulating international negotiations on climate change in collaboration with Model United Nations associations. This novel experimental format combines some of the advantages of lab and field experiments. Our results show that negotiating a common commitment on a uniform carbon price yields significantly higher emissions reductions, more participation, and more equal contributions than individual commitments to a non-binding common goal à la Paris.

Marius Alt, Carlo Gallier, Martin Kesternich, **Bodo Sturm**

How to ratchet up? An experiment on effective ratcheting in social dilemma situations

How to design an effective ratchet mechanism? This question is of utmost importance for the success of the Paris Agreement under the United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change. Within the agreement, high hopes are placed on the ratchet mechanism, which prescribes that nationally determined contributions (NDCs) have to increase over time, to avoid dangerous climate change and limit global warming to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial level (e.g., UNFCCC, 2015). However, there are doubts regarding the effectiveness of the ratchet mechanism. At

the end of 2020, the latest round of NDCs falls short of its expectations. Parties were supposed to submit new and more ambitious climate pledges, but a large part did not. Even among the newly submitted targets, many show no increase in ambitions since the first pledges made five years ago (see, e.g., Gabbatiss, 2021; UNFCCC, 2021). In this regard, Gallier and Sturm (2021) show that the effect of a ratchet mechanism can be detrimental, because it increases the risk of being exploited. They find that agents strategically restrict their contribution levels in early periods of an repeated

cumulative public goods game in order to limit the increased risk of being free-ridden. All this shows that the mechanism is not effective and needs to be revised. This raises the question how to design an effective ratchet mechanism.

This is exactly the question we address. We design an experiment to testbed different institutional mechanisms that aim to reduce agents' risk of being exploited and, thereby, counteract the incentive to strategically restrict public good contribution levels in early periods. Following Gallier and Sturm (2021), agents in the contribution stage of our cumulative public goods game have to contribute at least as much as in the period before. In order to reduce the risk of being exploited, we add a stage (minimum contribution stage) prior to the contribution stage. At first, agents play the minimum contribution stage where they collectively agree upon a minimum contribution level for the first period of the contribution stage. It is based on the principle of the "lowest common denominator" (e.g., Orzen, 2008; Kesternich et al., 2014) and all agents have to propose an individual minimum contribution level to the public good. The minimum of all proposals is selected to determine the lower bound of agents' public good contribution levels in the first period of the contribution stage. From period two onward in the contribution stage, the ratchet mechanism applies and agents' public good contribution levels have to be at least as high as their contributions in the period before. We test two different minimum contribution mechanisms that differ in whether the corresponding contribution levels are binding. If the minimum contribution levels

are binding (binding minimum ratcheting), proposing the socially optimal public good contribution level becomes a weakly dominant strategy in the minimum contribution stage of the game. If it is not binding (non-binding minimum ratcheting), it is "cheap talk" and should not affect agents' public good contribution levels – at least, if we assume that agents are rational and purely self-interested.

Parallel Session 1: Heterogeneity

Björn Frank, Elke Groh, Deborah Kraft

The futile search for the average subject: The jaggedness principle applies to economic experiments

The jaggedness principle claims that no person is (close to) average with respect to all criteria. This empirical law has been popularized by Rose (2016), based on his rediscovery of Daniels (1952). While Daniels studies body dimensions, we use data from the Global Preference Survey (Falk et al., 2018) and a new data set to confirm the principle for behaviour in economic experiments. Depending on which deviation from the statistical average we still count as roughly average behaviour for a single experiment, we either find no average subject", or only very few.

André Machwart

The effect of heterogeneous groups on public goods contributions

All over Europe, the population is becoming increasingly heterogeneous. In Germany, e.g., every fourth inhabitant has a migration background and this share is expected to increase further. This study uses an online-experiment to investigate individuals' willingness to contribute to a public good in mixed groups where a minority (majority) share has a migration background. It is examined whether the social characteristic “migration background“ promotes ingroup cooperation. The investigation consists of three parts: (1) A pre-experimental survey collects data on the individual migration background of participants. (2) Groups of three people are formed, each with a different proportion of persons with migration background. A public good game is used to measure subjects' willingness to cooperate. (3) A post-experimental questionnaire collects information on control variables, such as age, altruism, or morale.

Kerstin Mitterbacher, Stefan Palan, Jürgen Fleiß

Labor market choices of migrants and redistributive policies

We experimentally study economic migrants' willingness to take up work and integrate into society, and, in turn, destination country citizens' willingness to allow economic migrants to pursue formal work and integrate into society and its social security and welfare system. We find clear evidence for a reciprocal relationship between the individuals in these roles. The labor market participation of economic migrants co-moves with destination countries' openness to welcoming them. We conclude thatsupporting economic migrants in early labor market attachment is crucial to support a mutually beneficial co-existence in a society.

Parallel Session 2: Social Norms

Arno Apffelstaedt, **Bernd Irlenbusch**, Jan-Erik Lönnqvist, Gari Walkowitz

Fig-leaves in pro-social choice

People commonly try to conceal selfish decisions and protect their image by hiding behind allegedly unbiased entities. Metaphorically, following the Biblical Book of Genesis, artists use a fig leaf to hide depictions of genitals, e.g., Lucas Cranach's paintings of Adam and Eve or the ancient statue of Michelangelo's David. In a figurative sense people disapprovingly refer to the term "fig leaf" "to convey the covering up of an act or an object that is embarrassing or distasteful with something of innocuous appearance." (Wikipedia 2020) In this paper we investigate into the phenomenon of figleafing by trying to better understand under which conditions people employ a fig leaf and when it may or may not help to protect their image. Our results provide clear evidence of fig leaf usage. In further treatments we look deeper into the image explanation of fig leaf usage suggested in our theoretical model and also look into possible remedies.

Bettina Rockenbach, Sebastian Schneiders

Gender differences across economic games: Norms, expectations, and behavior

A large body of evidence finds men and women to behave differently in a variety of economic contexts. A prominent explanation is that different social norms (externally) prescribe different behavior. We present an experimental study to explicitly test this explanation across a variety of economic games. We study whether there are there different social norms for men and women, what expectations people have about the behavior of men and women and whether there are differences between social norms and expectations in these games. We find that women are expected to be more pro-social than men, and indeed, in observed play they are. These gender differences in expectations do not seem to be driven by gender differences in personal or social norms.

Alexis Belianin, Gregory Chernov, **Heike Hennig-Schmidt**, Olga Kuznetsova, Marina Ryzhkova, Gari Walkowitz

Regional differences in social preferences and beliefs – Evidence from an interactive online experiment in Russia

Social preferences are shaped by ideas, beliefs and values that people acquire from observation andrninteraction with other members of their own social group. Learning from peers can lead to stable socialrnnorms because people socially learn what is appropriate, and what is undesirable. The local environmentrnmay also induce adopting stereotypes from local peers about other regions in the country. Studyingrninterregional heterogeneity is important as national cohesiveness as well as interregional transactions arern-important factors for regional economic growth. Russia, the largest country in the world, offers arnparticularly good environment for exploring social preferences and addressing the question of interregionalrnheterogeneity that we investigate by means of an Ultimatum game experiment in the three Russian citiesrnMoscow, Samara and Tomsk. We found strong effects in behavior and beliefs with regard to the capital Moscow yetrnminor differences between the other two cities.

Parallel Session 2: Gender

Ann-Katrin Kienle

Under pressure: Heterogeneity and the support of neediness

Giving behaviour is very heterogeneous. At the same time, results from cost of control experiments show that reference points lower contributions in comparison to treatments without requirements. In this study I assume that neediness of others as requirements from the receiver homogenise prosocial behaviour. I hypothesise that needs lower heterogeneity and examine this by means of two samples: gender and effort of resource generation. For this reason, I conducted a laboratory experiment in which I induced different income brackets and variations of needs. After an encryption task, participants were allowed to allocate their earned income with a needy participant. Some of the recipients lacked a little and some a lot of income to overcome the financial threshold for further participation. I quantified effort of the participants in the form of stress during income generation as well as distribution decision and compared the data with the resting values of the individuals' heart rate variability (HRV). The results indicate that needs highly influence allocation behaviour. The higher the level of need, the less support the needy receive. Stressed women tend to disproportionately overcompensate for low levels of neediness. Men, on the other hand, give significantly less when stressed compared to unstressed male participants.

Graciela Kuechle, **Hannes Rau**

Gender differences in bargaining - Experimental evidence

We study gender differences and gender pairing effects in a laboratory experiment with alternating-offers bargaining for a fixed pie, framed as an employer-employee interaction. We vary the degree of asymmetry in bargaining power between roles, as well as the disclosure of genders of the negotiating partners. With low asymmetry, we find no gender effects in behavior or outcomes. When there is high asymmetry and gender is known, men achieve more favorable deals than women in both roles, especially in mixed gender pairings. These differences are significant, despite gender information being transmitted only in a very subtle way. However, differences disappear, when no gender information about the bargaining partner is provided. Additionally, we examine the bargaining strategies of the players in detail. In presence of high asymmetry, men behave more aggressively in mixed gender parings, while the opposite effect is true for women.

Maxim Ott

The dark side of preferential treatment

We investigate how subjects perceive each other's competence and how their willingness to cooperate differs following tournaments with and without affirmative action rules. Following a real effort two-person-tournament in which ties are broken either randomly or in favor of a certain group, we let subject guess each other's relative performance and engage in a gift-exchange. We find that both winners' and losers' relative performance is guessed lower when ties were broken in favor of an artificial group, but not if women were favored. Additionally we find that men, but not women, show different levels of cooperation following an affirmative-action-tournament, and those levels may be lower or higher depending on the tournament outcome, and which group benefitted from the affirmative action. Our findings suggest that affirmative action may have an effect on subsequent cooperation, with the magnitude, direction of that effect and affected groups likely depending on the specific context.

Parallel Session 2: Health

Ido Erev, Maximilian Hiller, **Stefan Klößner**, Gal Lifshitz, Vanessa Mertins, Yefim Roth

On the potential of promoting healthy behavior with repeated deposit contracts

The current paper clarifies the conditions under which small monetary incen tives are sufficient to motivate people to use a stress reduction app. Our analysis compares the impact of small bonus incentives with the impact of repeated deposit contracts. Accepting the daily contract provided the same gain from performing the breathing exercise as the bonus, but led to a larger loss when the participants did not use the app.

Theoretical analysis shows that deposit contracts are more effective than bonus incentives in motivating rational agents, and the known deviations from rationality in repeated decisions increase the contracts' advantage. These predictions are supported by the results from an intervention study with more than 180 participants. While the bonus incentives failed to increase the exercise rate, repeated deposit contracts boosted it from 58% to 83%. Moreover, the use of the contracts eliminated much of the cost that the intervention designer has to bear.

Ido Erev, **Maximilian Hiller**, Gal Lifshitz, Stefan Klößner, Yefim Roth, Vanessa Mertins

Walk the extra mile! Assessing motivational tools to promote physical activity

Previous interventions using monetary incentives or commitment devices to promote healthy behavior led to mixed results. The literature shows that these approaches are often expensive, yet not always helpful regarding performance or does not be attractive for participation at all. To overcome these limitations, we designed two commitment devices based on micro-incentive opt-in bets. We tested the bets and a simple bonus incentive in a field experiment with people who wanted to increase their physical activity by walking more but who failed to integrate the necessary behavior into their everyday life in the past. Results show that both tested betting commitment devices are much more cost-efficient without compromising positive performance effects in comparison to the bonus incentive and control (fixed pay). Since we've found strong evidence for self-selection, we ran a simulation task to clarify how to optimize the offers.

Astrid Dannenberg, **Eva Weingärtner**

The effects of environmental information and observability on food choice

The consumption of meat has major impacts on the environment, yet regulation is scarce both on the production and the consumption side. Our food choices are visible to all people with whom we spend our daily lives, which raises the question of whether people are adapting their diets to gain a green reputation, as has been observed for other environmentally relevant consumption choices. Using an experiment at a German university in which participants can choose between vegan, vegetarian, and meat-based sandwich vouchers, we examine how the provision of environmental information and observation by others influence choices. The results show that the provision of environmental information reduces the choice of meat vouchers by 10 percentage points when decisions are private, largely driven by female respondents. Observability effects are rather heterogenous, decreasing meat choices in some groups and meat-free choices in others. Somewhat surprisingly, the combination of environmental information and observability leaves respondents across groups less inclined to choose one of the meatless options. We discuss differences in social norms across groups as a potential source of varying observability effects. In addition, we propose two likely explanations for the adverse effects of an information-observability combination, namely the self-limiting benefits of reputation and the psychological theory of do-gooder derogation.

Parallel Session 2: Belief

Christoph Drobner, Sebastian Goerg

Motivated belief updating and rationalization of information

Manipulating the perceived ego-relevance of IQ tests, we show that subjects update their beliefs about their relative performance in an IQ test more optimistically as the weight on direct belief utility increases. This finding provides clean evidence for the optimistic belief updating hypothesis and supports theoretical models with direct belief utility. Moreover, we document that subjects discount the weight on direct belief utility when the number of bad signals increases. Taken together, these findings suggest that subjects use two alternative strategies to protect their ego despite the presence of objective information.

Thomas Neumann, Paul Bengart, Bodo Vogt

Which expectations to follow: the impact of first- and second-order beliefs on strategy choices in a stag hunt game

Many situations require coordinated actions of individuals to achieve common goals. Such situations include organizing mass-protests or adjusting behavior to new behavioral recommendations that aim to slow down the spread of a contagious disease. However, there is a risk of coordination failure in such situations that can lead to a worse outcome for those who acted in coordinated manner than for those who chose not to. In this paper, we investigate the main determinant of individuals' decisions in these situations, to find out whether beliefs regarding the others' action (empirical expectations), beliefs regarding the others' beliefs (normative expectations), or risk attitudes are dominant. To this end, we conducted an experiment analyzing the relationship between individuals' choices in a stag hunt game, their probabilistic empirical and normative expectations (i.e., first-order beliefs and second-order beliefs, respectively), and their risk attitudes. Our central finding is that expectations, but not the risk attitudes, explain individuals' strategy selection. Also, we found evidence that normative expectations are a better strategy selection predictor than the empirical expectations are. This could have implications for developing more targeted strategies intended to promote new behavioral standards and to guide individuals' behavior toward a welfare- maximizing equilibrium.

Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Marcus Giamattei, Susanna Grundmann

A workhorse design for macroeconomic dynamics: First experimental evidence on a sequential coin game

In macroeconomics, subjects often make decisions on variables that are strategic complements. The dynamics are backward looking (past decisions can be updated) and forward looking (future events must be anticipated). The widespread evidence of inertia in such tasks is often explained by higher-order beliefs – the idea that one should not fully adjust when others might fail to do so or are believed to think that others might fail. We propose a workhorse experiment that might shed light on the power of this explanation and that overcomes various design problems, such as weak marginal incentives and subjects' failure to understand convex cost functions and the dynamics of the game. Our subjects position riders to defend an area against thieves. They update their choices in the face of an unfolding composite coin game. Coin flips determine whether updated choices are implemented and the number of attacks by thieves. Subjects incur costs of damage that increase quadratically with the size of the undefended area. Our experiment excludes a variety of reasons for inertia. We find evidence that individually playing subjects on average come close to the optimum. This paves the way for the aforementioned types of interaction among subjects. Contrary to a variety of alternative approaches that were tested previously, our design can thus operate as a workhorse for subsequent research on the nature of inertial decision making.

Parallel Session 3: Collective Decision Making

Regina Anselm, Deepti Bhatia, Urs Fischbacher, Jan Hausfeld

Attribution of responsibility: Reward and punishment in an eye-tracking experiment

This study contributes to the understanding of how people attribute responsibility for collective decisions which are taken sequentially. With the help of a laboratory eye-tracking experiment we investigate how subjects punish and reward others for a collective allocation task along three dimensions: aggregate behavior, heterogeneity and the underlying decision making process. We find that subjects mainly attribute responsibility according to choices and pivotality. Heterogeneity for attributing responsibility exists and similar patterns occur when using reward or punishment to express perceived responsibility. Furthermore, people tend to punish others in the same way as they reward others. Process data reveal that the behavioral importance of pivotality for responsibility attribution is not reflected in the information acquisition. Subjects who are part of the collective decision are aware of the responsibility linked to pivotality by expressing higher response times. Also, subjects often behave against their true preference in order to avoid being pivotal for unpopular decisions or ensure being pivotal for popular decisions.

Janina Kraus

Attribution of responsibility in sequential decision making

Many decisions in organizations, politics and economics are taken jointly by groups. Often, other people, who are not part of the decision-making process, are affected by the resulting outcomes. Therefore, it is of relevance to understand how the individual group members are held responsible for the collective decision. In a recent work Bartling et al. (2015) analyzed responsibility attribution for collective decision-making in a sequential voting game, where three decision-makers decide sequentially about an equal or unequal allocation which was implemented for themselves and three other recipients. They found out that the pivotal decision-maker was punished significantly more than non-pivotal decision makers. However, it still remains unclear what other factors influence the attribution of responsibility of collective decisions. Thus, in this study the work of Bartling et al. (2015) is extended in two ways: first, the decision right is assigned through one of two different (legitimate) mechanisms and second, one allocation is already preselected as a default. The attribution of individual responsibility is measured by eliciting the punishment choices of recipients. The main result of Bartling et al. (2015), that the pivotal decision-maker was punished significantly more, could not be replicated. Instead, the unkindness of a choice determines the punishment behavior of recipients.

Tim Krieger, **Christine Meemann**, Stefan Traub

Inequality, life expectancy, and the intragenerational redistribution puzzle - Some experimental evidence

In most OECD countries, pension reform policy has decreased thelevel of intragenerational redistribution over the last three decades, that is,redistribution among members of the same generation with high and lowpension entitlements. This trend has occurred despite heterogeneity in lifeexpectancy linked to socioeconomic status having a regressive impact on outcomes. This paper contributes to solving this puzzle by means of a controlled laboratory experiment. We study the causal relationship between inequality of entitlements, mortality risk, and the size of redistribution in a stylized social security system. We find that mortality risk, if negatively correlated with entitlements, significantly lowers subjects' willingness to redistribute payoffs from high-entitlement to low-entitlement subjects. We explain this finding with reference to a `blame the victim' attitude amongst subjects. Members of the social security system interpret the higher mortality rate of low-entitlement individuals as the result of lower effort, implying that these individuals can be held accountable for their misery and therefore deserve only reduced benefits.

Parallel Session 3: Compliance

Theodoros Alysandratos, Abigail Barr, Cormac Bryce, Thorsten Chmura, Elizabeth David-Barrett, **Marcus Giamattei**

International anti-corruption laws and local social norms

We investigate trans-national differences in willingness to (a) engage in corrupt-like acts, and (b) initiate processes leading to the punishment of others who engage in such acts. We investigate the extent to which these differences can be explained by variations in beliefs about others' behavioral propensities and the social appropriateness of the behaviors. Further, we test how behaviors and beliefs are affected when we vary (c) the country of origin of the potential bribe-payer (an investor) and (d) the country of origin of the enforcement officer. We do this with data from 8 different countries that we collected in an online experiment. Our paper gathers insights into how local social norms, beliefs, and expectations about others' behavioral integrity are affected by and interact with the international legal architecture aimed at combatting corruption and bribery.

Susanna Grundmann, Simeon Schudy, Lisa Spantig

Measuring individual preferences for truth-telling

Fraudulent behaviors are prevalent in many markets, particularly, when lying at the individual level is not observable. Aggregate data from controlled environments suggest heterogeneous preferences for truth-telling which are determined by the combination of an intrinsic motivation to be honest and the desire to be seen as honest. However, aggregate data do not allow us to understand which truth-telling types (co)exist and how prevalent each type is. Both are crucial for the cost-effective design of institutions. We propose a novel experimental measure of individual preferences for truth-telling that keeps true states of the world unobservable. The key idea of the experiment is not to rely upon actual reports, but to measure participant's intention to i) be dishonest and ii) avoid being seen as dishonest. This allows to identify the importance of both motives at the individual level without knowing whether participants actually lied. First results suggest systematic heterogeneity in preference types, for whom one or both underlying motives matter. Also, the intention to be dishonest turns out to be predictive of behavior in two incentivized validation tasks. The intention to be seen as honest appears to matter most for participants who have some, but not too strong intentions to be dishonest. Based on these findings, we propose an even simpler version of our measure suited for representative samples allowing for individual-level predictions of behavior in many other domains.

Wladislaw Mill, Cornelius Schneider

The bright side of tax evasion

This paper presents, to our knowledge, the first empirical investigation of the direct relationship between the opportunity to evade and overall tax revenues. Resuscitating the old work by Weiss (1976), we test the hypothesis of how an optimal income tax might include incentives to evade to increase overall tax revenues: Such incentives partially offset the undesirable distortions of taxes on labor supply by lowering effective tax rates. We implemented an original real effort experiment in an online labormarket (MTurk) with over 1,000 participants. Our findings not only show significant positive labor supply responses to the opportunity to evade (increased labor supply by on average 37%). Also the expected tax revenue significantly and substantially increased by more than 50%. Strikingly, this effect persists when comparing effective tax rates: Lowering effective tax rates through the opportunity to evade is more efficient than simply lowering statutory tax rates. Since this effect is strongest for low productive individuals, our work also contributes to the literature on optimal tax administration: Facing limited resources, tax enforcement should focus on high productive individuals.

Parallel Session 3: COVID-19

Frauke von Bieberstein, **Anna-Corinna Kulle**, Stefanie Schumacher

What strikes the eye: How point-of-use reminders can increase compliance with COVID-19 measures

Increased hand hygiene is one of the new behavioral routines advocated globally to contain COVID-19. However, learning new routines is difficult. In a field experiment conducted in cooperation with a Swiss supermarket chain, we examine the effectiveness of point-of-use reminders placed directly at a hand disinfection station. The two experimental treatments feature a life-sized cardboard figure holding a “thank-you” sign. One treatment displayed a young woman who may be an effective reminder due to high salience and/or high perceived attractiveness. The other treatment featured an older woman who could entail a surprise effect and be perceived as more authentic due to her higher vulnerability to COVID 19. With the young figure, hand disinfection rates increase by 3.3 percentage points compared to the control treatment. In contrast, we do not find a significant effect of the older figure. Supplementary survey data allow us to explore potential mechanisms behind the results. The findings suggest ways to increase compliant

Manuel Hoffmann, **Bernd Josef Leisen**, Vanessa Mertins

My peers want me to stop drinking! Evidence on active peer pressure in an online experiment during COVID-19 restrictions

High alcohol consumption is not only linked to individual harm but also to considerable social harm. However, alcohol is not only one of the most socially tolerated drug, it also socially demanded in many situations. Thus, peer pressure is considered an expression of social demand and it can exacerbate excessive alcohol consumption and its consequences. Most of the literature focusses on passive peer pressure to drink where individual alcohol intake is influenced by the consumption of peers through observations only. In contrast, to enrich our understanding of equilibrium supply and demand of peer pressure, we examine active peer pressure on the supply side through several online drinking field experiments since alcohol consumption in groups increasingly shifted to the world wide web during the COVID-19 pandemic. We introduce a unique distribution mechanism to elicit positive direct peer pressure by asking individuals to offer money to other individuals to abstain from drinking while systematically varying feedback on each group member's alcohol consumption. We find that individuals who receive information about the intoxication of their peers, pressure the highly intoxicated more to abstain from drinking than the lowly intoxicated. Peers, who receive a low-cost possibility to pressure others, support the convergence to the mean.

Tassilo Sobotta

Coalition formation in a third-party social dilemma

A pandemic event like the spread of Covid-19 stresses the health care systems in many countries, so that there is a great need for an effective vaccine. However, if there is a vaccine, it will be limited in the beginning and those countries who can afford it will buy as much as they can to protect their own citizens. This so-called “vaccine nationalism” can prolong the pandemic: While countries with access to vaccines will benefit due to a slow down of the pandemic in their regions, this strategy will cost lives in low-income countries, give the virus further opportunity to mutate and evade vaccines. Therefore, cooperation in favor of low-income countries is required. Indeed, there are some ongoing efforts to coordinate a global COVID-19 response like COVAX, a coalition of some high-income countries to support low-income countries getting access to vaccines.
This study analyzes under which conditions subjects form such coalitions: In a laboratory experiment decision-makers can cooperate for the sake of an affected third-party in a social dilemma game (“third-party social dilemma”). While gains from cooperation only go to the third-party, cooperative behavior can be exploited. I test whether a coalition of participants that want to help the third-party can overcome this dilemma situation. The study analyzes two mechanisms: Coalitions with a binding agreement and coalitions with a binding agreement that also trigger sanctions on free-riding participants outside

the coalition. Results show that participants are willing to join a coalition to help the third-party. But there are no stable coalitions without sanctions. If the coalition triggers sanctions on free-riding participants, almost all groups reach full cooperation.

Parallel Session 3: Communication

Dmitri Bershadskyy, **Alexandra Seidel**

Choosing a victim you know – the ambiguous effect of communication on the mobbing game

Bullying causes severe damages to the victims and is a prime example of antisocial behaviour involving communication. Using the 'mobbing game' by Abbink and Dogan (2018) we investigate the role of communication on bullying in a laboratory experiment. Doing so we investigate two sets of questions. First, manipulating the communication medium and the presence of strategic communication, we analyze how communication and strategic considerations affect the formation of bullying. Second, we analyze whether uninvolved subjects can detect bullying and bullying victims using the communication protocols.

Ayala Arad, **Kevin Grubiak**, Stefan Penczynski

Does Communicating within a Team Influence Individuals' Reasoning and Decisions?

In recent years, experimental economics has seen a rise in the collection and analysis of choice-process data, such as for example communication transcripts. The purpose of this paper is to understand whether the collection of communication data influences the behaviour and the reasoning of the observed participants. Our treatment manipulations allow us to isolate the significance of (1) belonging to a team, (2) actively suggesting an action to the team partner, and (3) justifying the suggestion in a written text to the team partner. Across three different games, we find no systematic evidence of changed decision distributions and individual reasoning due to changes in aspects (1)-(3) of our communication protocol.

Christian Biener, **Aline Waeber**

Would I lie to you? How interaction with chatbots induces dishonesty

Is dishonesty more prevalent in interaction with a machine as opposed to a human? We analyze this question using an innovative experimental setup involving the reporting of an unobserved payout-relevant random draw either to a chatbot or another human in a chat interaction while also varying the degree of agency. We find that reporting to a chatbot that is unable to demonstrate agency induces the lowest levels of honesty, whereas reporting to a human, which can demonstrate such agency, generates the highest levels of honesty. We identify a stronger role of social-image concerns and social norms when a person interacts with another human and show that subjects abstain from lying more when they have more time to reflect on their behavior. Our results have implications for designing efficient means of interaction between consumers and organizations in a variety of different contexts in the digital economy.

Parallel Session 4: Group Behaviour

Katharina Werner, Swee Hoon Chuah

Reconciliation after inter-group conflict: Testing different forms of contact in the lab

Encounter programs are widely used in post-conflict reconciliation, assuming that contact between members of the conflicting parties can re-establish cooperation across groups by fostering forgiveness, mutual understanding and trust. Such encounters often combine different forms of contact between group members, ranging from pure meetings over programs that focus on experienced sufferings and emotions to joint projects with a common goal. Although such encounter programs require a lot of resources, the efficacy of contact after conflict lacks empirical support. What type of contact works and through which channels?

Philipp Doerrenberg, Christoph Feldhaus, **Felix Kölle**, Axel Ockenfels

Willingness of individuals and groups to intervene in autonomous decision-making

There is a long-standing normative debate about paternalistic choice and which behaviors shall be avoided or forbidden in society. Recent literature in economics has studied why, when, and how individuals intervene in other people's choices. Often, however, intervention decisions are made by groups rather than individuals, such as legislative bodies, political parties, or management boards. In this paper, we study whether groups and individuals differ in the way they intervene in others' choices. Using a laboratory experiment, we find that groups are significantly less likely to hard intervene by banning options from decision-makers. Instead, they more often use softer interventions in form of recommendations. These effects are robust across two different settings, one involving a social dimension and the other one involving an intertemporal dimension. An analysis of the group chats suggests that the softer interventions by groups are due to social image concerns.

Parallel Session 4: Incentives

Sven Hoeppner

Incentives to breach and compensation

Efficient breach theory recommends expectation damages as remedy for breach of contract, because this incentivizes contract parties to perform when that is efficient and breach when that is efficient. A broad stream of evidence shows, however, that people behave rather pro-socially and, in particular, tend to keep their promises and honor their agreements, which questions the heuristic value of efficient breach theory. I provide an experimental institution test that investigates the effect of compensatory damages and its two features (fine and recovery) on agent's willingness-to-breach. Second movers in a trust game receive a surprising incentive to act non-cooperatively and I elicit their reserve price to do so. Under compensatory damages and fines, agents demand a lower reserve price for non-cooperative play. The recovery procedure reduces the reserve price when the players did not agree to cooperative exchange, but increases the reserve price given agreement. Compensatory damages and the recovery procedure induce more (less) punishment of non-cooperative agents, when there was agreement (no agreement) between the players. These results imply that compensatory damages facilitate efficient breach and, therefore, contribute to overall social welfare generated from contracts.

Yannik Diebel, **Thomas Lauer**

You get what you pay for – The effect of incentives on quality and quantity in an experimental real-effort task

Organizations across all industries face a common problem, when they try to incentivize their employees. Typically, incentives are expected to affect one of at least two dimensions of the produced output: quality or quantity. Surprisingly, little is known about the effect on the dimension that is not incentivized. We present a novel experimental design to measure the effects of monetary incentives on the quantity and the quality of participants' output in a real effort task. We find that both dimensions of output can be successfully incentivized, without inevitably reducing efforts in the not incentivized dimension. This effect holds also for the two-dimensional incentives for quantity and quality. Incentivizing an additional dimension, however, does not come for free, and gains in productivity and increased output value do not necessarily cover all additional costs the organization has to pay for the incentive scheme.

Ido Erev, **Devin Kwasniok**, Bernd Josef Leisen, Vanessa Mertins

The motivational effect of detailed volunteer certificates – Evidence from a field experiment on intergenerational cooperation

The high importance of career-oriented motives within the group of young volunteers and recent evidence that volunteering can improve employment opportunities, suggest that simple volunteer certificates can motivate young adults to become socially engaged, but not necessarily to commit themselves regularly over a long period of time. We hypothesize that volunteer certificates with information on individual engagement can motivate new volunteers to perform at a higher level compared to traditional certificates without individual performance information. To test this hypothesis, we implement both certificate types in a series of field experiments in which younger volunteers assist older citizens in completing tasks with their smartphone, tablet or computer. The preliminary results confirm that providing detailed performance information with the certificate increases the frequency and duration of the individual volunteer work. The strength of this motivational effect varies depending on the underlying performance assessment mechanism (bonus, repeated betting).

Parallel Session 4: Fairness & Work

Martin Fochmann, **Florian Sachs**, Joachim Weimann

Managing wages: Fairness norms of low- and high-performing team members

Services are often provided by groups. The question of remuneration arises both at the group level and for each individual group member. We examine the question of how relative pay should be designed within the group if all group members are to regard the payment scheme as fair. We use a three-step laboratory experiment to compare which fairness norms are chosen by high-performing and low-performing group members. It turns out that both types of group members prefer the performance pay principle. Equal pay is negligible. However, the low performers use their bargaining power to improve their position, but without deviating from the performance principle remarkably. A random influence on the performance of the players does not change the results.

Peter Andre

Shallow meritocracy: An experiment on fairness views

Meritocracy claims to judge individuals by their effort and hard work but not by the circumstances they were born into. Effort choices are, however, often endogenous to and shaped by circumstances, opportunities, and incentives. I ask whether merit judgments are sensitive to the endogeneity of choices. In a series of incentivized experiments with a large, representative US sample, study participants judge how much money two workers deserve for the effort they exert. In the treatment condition, unequal circumstances strongly discourage one of the workers to work hard. Nonetheless, I find that individuals hold the disadvantaged worker fully responsible for his choice. They ignore that choices are endogenous to circumstances. As a result, choices ``launder'' circumstances and legitimate the ensuing inequality. The neglect occurs even though participants are aware of the endogeneity. Instead, I experimentally identify the uncertainty of the counterfactual state -- what would have happened on a level playing field -- as the cause of the neglect. A structural model of merit views confirms these patterns, and a vignette study replicates them in exemplary real-world scenarios.

Cornelia Strauss

Linking nominal wages to unemployment through fairness concerns: Experimental evidence

Current research on nominal wage rigidity has questioned the phenomenon of insufficient downward adjustment of wages in order to avert increases in unemployment. We extend findings that fiat currency acquires value endogenously and hence functions as a medium of account and a –temporary – store of value in a monetary stable environment by a monetary supply shock. To this end, we run a modified gift-exchange experiment with flexible wages that are denoted in fiat currency. After the first part of the experiment, a monetary shock whose exact size is unknown to subjects reduces the overall amount of money in the economy. Since the series of employment relations is indefinite, a multiplicity of equilibria is possible including full employment equilibria. We then compare the effect of the monetary shock on real activity between the baseline treatment with complete contracts and the main treatment where contracts are incomplete.

Parallel Session 4: Prisoner‘s Dilemma

Christian Grund, **Katja Rebecca Tilkes**

The impact of monitoring of cooperation behavior and decisions on group membership extension – evidence from public good experiments

In this study, we explore cooperation behavior in groups with permanent and temporary group membership where the temporary group member is affected by the fear of replacement. A leader decides between the replacement of a temporary group member or a group membership extension for that person, based on (i) information about individual inputs or (ii) information about group inputs. We experimentally examine cooperation behavior before and after the leader’s decision and the extension decision itself to understand the effect of information provided and of membership types. Preliminary results indicate that differences in cooperation behavior occur depending on individual input information or group input information, and cooperation is mainly driven by the temporary group member’s fear of replacement but cooperation vanishes after

contract extension. The leader's replacement decision is affected by previous mean contributions of the temporary group member and of the group itself to the public good. After leader's decision, contributions by types to the public good decline in all treatments but do not differ significantly compared to contributions before leader's decision.

Lydia Mechtenberg, Christine Meemann, **Stefan Traub**

Institutional change in the infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma

We experimentally study subjects' cooperation behavior in the infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma with reinforcement. Using the model setup by Greif and Laitin (2004), we test whether positive feedback (cooperation increases future payoffs) leads to higher increasing cooperation and negative feedback (cooperation leads to lower future payoffs) leads to lower decreasing cooperation as compared to neutral feedback. Preliminary data analysis suggests that positive reinforcement does not result in a self-enforcing institution of cooperation, although subjects are more likely to believe that their opponents cooperate. Negative reinforcement clearly undermines cooperation.

Irenaeus Wolff

Predicting voluntary contributions by 'revealed-preference nash equilibrium'

The 'selfish' Nash-equilibrium predicts zero-contributions in linear public-good situations. Social-preference models also accommodate positive contributions, but rarely come with a calibration that would allow for quantitative predictions. A 'revealed-preference Nash-equilibrium' (RPNE) built on elicited conditional-contribution preferences allows for such a prediction. But how well does this model predict out-of-sample in one-shot games, and why? This paper shows that the RPNE predicts aggregated data well, despite the fact that participants lack information about the pro-sociality of their opponents. I then show that the out-of-sample prediction is even better for a new data set from a situation that approximates mutual knowledge of preferences. Finally, individual-level predictions show two things. First, the findings are not an artifact of the aggregate-level analysis. Participants' behaviour is best explained by RPNE behaviour—unless they show stochastic preferences and expect the same from others. In that case, their contributions are best explained by uniformly-random choice. Second, in case of multiple equilibria, the modal choice corresponds to the Pareto-dominant equilibrium as already posited by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). However, the majority of the participants seem to use different equilibrium-selection criteria.

Parallel Session 5: Labor Session I

Thomas Lauer

FAIRe Forschungsprozesse in den Verhaltenswissenschaften

Abdolkarim Sadrieh

Die Zukunft der experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung im Labor - Ein trübe Aussicht und ein (möglicher) Rettungsplan

Olaf Bock*

Laborexperimente unter Pandemiebedingungen

Parallel Session 5: Algorithm Aversion

Ibrahim Filiz, Jan René Judek, Marco Lorenz, Markus Spiwoks

Die Tragik der Algorithm Aversion

Algorithmen bewältigen viele Aufgaben bereits zuverlässiger als menschliche Experten. Trotzdem zeigen einige Wirtschaftssubjekte eine ablehnende Haltung gegenüber Algorithmen (Algorithm Aversion). In manchen Entscheidungssituationen kann ein Fehler schwerwiegende Konsequenzen haben, in anderen Entscheidungssituationen nicht. Wir untersuchen im Rahmen eines Framing-Experimentes den Zusammenhang zwischen der Tragweite der Entscheidungssituation einerseits und der Häufigkeit der Algorithm Aversion andererseits. Dabei zeigt sich, dass die Algorithm Aversion umso häufiger auftritt, je gravierender die möglichen Konsequenzen einer Entscheidung sind. Gerade bei besonders wichtigen Entscheidungen führt somit die Algorithm Aversion zu einer Reduzierung der Erfolgswahrscheinlichkeit. Das kann man als die Tragik der Algorithm Aversion bezeichnen.

Ibrahim Filiz, **Jan René Judek**, Marco Lorenz, Markus Spiwoks

Reduzierung der Algorithm Aversion durch Erfahrung

Wir untersuchen experimentell die Persistenz der Algorithm Aversion im Hinblick auf Lernprozesse. Probanden sind aufgefordert in 40 Runden je eine Aktienkursprognose (steigend oder fallend) abzugeben. Es steht ein Prognosecomputer (Algorithmus) zur Verfügung, der eine Erfolgsquote von 70% aufweist. Intuitive Prognosen der Probanden führen in aller Regel zu einer deutlich schlechteren Erfolgsquote. Feedbacks nach jeder Prognoserunde und ein klarer ökonomischer Anreiz führen dazu, dass die Probanden ihre eigenen Prognosefähigkeiten besser einzuschätzen lernen.

Dabei geht auch die Algorithm Aversion signifikant zurück.

Zulia Gubaydullina, Jan René Judek, **Marco Lorenz**, Markus Spiwoks

Gestaltungswille und Algorithm Aversion – Die Auswirkungen der Einflussnahme im Prozess der algorithmischen Entscheidungsfindung auf die Algorithm Aversion

Obwohl Algorithmen in vielen Anwendungsgebieten präzisere Prognosen abgeben als Menschen, weigern sich Entscheidungsträger häufig, auf Algorithmen zurückzugreifen. In einem ökonomischen Experiment untersuchen wir, ob das Ausmaß dieses als „Algorithm Aversion" bekannten Phänomens reduziert werden kann, indem Entscheidungsträgern eine Einflussmöglichkeit auf die Ausgestaltung des Algorithmus eingeräumt wird (Einflussmöglichkeit auf den algorithmischen Input). Zusätzlich replizieren wir die Studie von Dietvorst et al. (2018). Darin zeigt sich, dass die Algorithm Aversion deutlich zurückgeht, sofern die Subjekte am Ende die Ergebnisse des Algorithmus – und sei es nur um wenige Prozent – verändern können (Einflussmöglichkeit auf den algorithmischen Output). In der vorliegenden Studie bestätigt sich, dass die Algorithm Aversion bei einer Einflussmöglichkeit auf den algorithmischen Output signifikant zurückgeht. Eine Einflussmöglichkeit auf den algorithmischen Input scheint allerdings nur bedingt geeignet, die Algorithm Aversion zu reduzieren. Die begrenzte Möglichkeit zur Modifikation des algorithmischen Outputs reduziert die Algorithm Aversion effektiver als die Möglichkeit, Einfluss auf den algorithmischen Input zu nehmen.

Parallel Session 5: Reputation

Marcus Wiens, **Markus Lüttenberg**, Frank Schultmann

Beeinflussung von Firmenreputation durch Sicherheitsbestand – eine experimentelle Untersuchung

Im Rahmen eines ökonomischen Experiments mit über 250 Teilnehmern wurde die Forschungsfrage untersucht, inwiefern Reputation (induziert durch die wiederholte Spielstruktur) in einer störanfälligen Lieferkette mit dem Bevorratungsverhalten eines Unternehmens und der Loyalität des Kunden gegenüber dem Unternehmen interagiert. In dem Experiment werden Lieferunterbrechungen simuliert, auf die sich ein Spieler in der Firmen-Rolle durch Wahl eines kostenintensiven Sicherheitsbestands wappnen kann. Es wird experimentell überprüft, ob und in welchem Ausmaß die Loyalität bzw. „churn rate" (= Abwanderungsrate) der Kunden durch die Reputation des Unternehmens beeinflusst wird. Darüber hinaus spielt für langfristige Kunden-/Unternehmensbeziehungen (Interaktionen) die Reputation des Unternehmens eine wichtige Rolle. Ein Unternehmen kann in Phasen häufiger Störungen eine positive Reputation aufbauen, indem es Produkte zuverlässig liefert. Das Experiment bestimmt den wirtschaftlichen Wert der Reputation durch Verfügbarkeit von Gütern einer Firma.

Christoph Huber, Christos Litsios, Annika Nieper, **Timo Promann**

You lie? I lie? How social norms and reputational concerns affect honesty

This paper investigates whether social norms and reputational concerns affect honest behavior interactively. Participants of our online experiment are playing a version of the die roll game by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013). A difference in perceived social norms is induced by grouping participants with either three players who behaved honestly in the die roll game before or three dishonestly behaving players. Reputational concerns are supposed to be stronger for participants who's decision is made public to their group and who receive feedback by their group concerning this decision. We expect that reputational concerns increase honesty when the norm is to be honest, yet that reputational concerns can have a backfiring effect when the norm is to be dishonest, i.e., reputational concerns could make people act more according to the underlying social norm – in this case of dishonesty and thereby encourage dishonesty.

Jan-Philipp Krügel, Fabian Paetzel

The impact of fake reviews on reputation systems and efficiency

Online interactions are frequently governed by reputation systems that allow users to evaluate each other after an interaction. Effective reputation systems can increase trust and may improve efficiency in market settings. In recent years, however, fake reviews have become increasingly prevalent. Since it is difficult to clearly identify fake reviews in field studies, we design a laboratory experiment. Using a repeated public good game with a reputation system, we study (i) how feedback manipulation influences the reliability of average ratings and (ii) whether the existence of manipulated ratings reduces efficiency. We find that feedback manipulation generally decreases the reliability of average ratings in comparison to a control treatment where cheating is not possible. When manipulation is possible and free, average ratings become less reliable, expectations are lower and both cooperation and efficiency are significantly reduced. When there are costs of manipulation, however, average ratings are more reliable and contributions and efficiency are not impaired. Interestingly, this is the case even when costs of manipulation are comparatively low.

Parallel Session 5: Markets

Barbara Ikica, Simon Jantschgi, **Heinrich Nax,** Diego Nunez Duran, Bary Pradelski

A large-scale reproduction of the CDA á la Vernon Smith

Prices tend to converge rapidly to competitive prices in traditional markets for non-durable goods. An open question has been whether and why the same applies in online markets inlight of the increase in size, anonymity and information decentrality that characterizes them. We conducted controlled experiments. In terms of prices, we find that convergence doesoccur, but not necessarily fast. Moreover, dynamics consistently favor buyers over sellers. Wedevelop a micro model of behavior, and link our empirical findings with theoretical conditionsunder which fast convergence occurs. In particular, we explain why price convergence occurs from below.

Franziska Heinicke, Wladislaw Mill, Henrik Orzen

Bargaining under the threat of a nuclear option

This paper addresses bargaining with a nuclear option. There are important real-world settings in which such an option is present and can be used to cause considerable harm. Being in control of a nuclear option is commonly seen as the ultimate threat and therefore as being effective in putting maximal pressure on the other party. However, going nuclear is often very costly to the nuclear-option holder herself and thus might not always be credible. We study the effect of a nuclear option in an unstructured one-shot bargaining experiment to test whether a nuclear option can indeed improve the bargaining position of the party holding the threat. We find that the command over a nuclear option increases the number of successful negotiations -- but only for pareto-non-improving situations. The nuclear option does not benefit the nuclear-option holder in most cases but substantially reduces the other party's payoff. The situation is particularly dire for the other party if she would have had more bargaining power but now is not able to utilize it due to the threat of the nuclear option.

Wasilios Hariskos, **Manfred Königstein**, Kostantinos G. Papadopoulos

Anti-competitive effects of partial cross-ownership: experimental evidence

In theory, partial cross-ownership affects product prices and consumer welfare negatively, but empirical evidence is highly controversial. For competition policy it is important whether such effcts are substantial enough to cause action. We report a lab experiment on a homogeneous duopoly market with symmetric passive crossownership in which the degree of cross-ownership varies between treatments (LOW vs HIGH). We argue that the observed negative effects are substantial enough to be considered problematic in real markets.

Parallel Session 6: Labor-Session II

Max Grossmann

Privatsphäre und Datenschutz in Online-Experimenten

Özgür Gürerk

Experimente in der virtuellen Realität: Vorteile und Herausforderungen

Regina Anselm, Irenaeus Wolff

z-Tree 5: Neue Features und erste Erfahrungen

Parallel Session 6: Sustainability & Norms

Lara Bartels, **Madeline Werthschulte**

Why do subsidies work? Field experimental evidence from subsidizing energy efficiency

With the aim of reducing energy consumption due to the associated externalities, a number of recently introduced governmental policies concentrate around subsidizing household energy efficiency investments. Yet, it is not well understood why subsidies are effective in increasing the demand for energy efficiency. In addition to decreasing the price, a subsidy conveys the information that policy-makers recommend the subsidized product. Thus, a subsidy may not only affect demand by shifting the budget constraint but also by directly influencing utility. This study uses a framed field experiment with citizens of Mannheim to decompose (i) whether there is an additional impact of a subsidy on energy efficiency investments beyond a pure price effect, and (ii) which fraction of this additional impact is explained by a “recommendation effect.” Results have implications for the cost-effectiveness of energy-saving subsidies. It is ex ante unclear whether the additional demand response of a subsidy compared to recommendation justifies its higher costs.

Paul Bengart, Bodo Vogt

Effects and interactions of labels’ color scheme and the individual difference variable lay rationalism on pro-environmental choices

Recent research on eco-labeling suggests that labels with traffic light colors that communicate an evaluation of product attributes are more effective at guiding consumers toward environmentally friendlier products than those that merely provide numerical information. However, it is still not clear whether traffic light labels’ effect is attributable to the additional information that the colors provide, or whether the colors themselves impact consumer choices. In this paper, we investigate the influence of labels’ color scheme on consumer preference for environmentally friendly electricity products. We conducted an experiment in which the participants had to choose between electricity products differing in price and in their carbon emissions. The products had labels based on either traffic lights or grayscale colors to classify their carbon emissions as low, medium, or high. Furthermore, we used the lay rationalism scale to assess participants' tendency to either base their decisions more on feelings or more on reason. The two main findings were that traffic light labels decreased the choice share of lower emission electricity and that there is an interaction effect between color scheme and lay rationalism. Our data underline the importance of examining different label formats and suggest that labels should be designed according to the decision-making style of the target group.

Sabrina Jeworrek, Joschka Waibel

Alone at home: The impact of social distancing on norm-consistent behavior

Around the globe, the COVID-19 pandemic has turned daily live upside down, with social distancing being the most effective method to contain the virus until herd immunity is reached. By conducting two experiments and using the priming method to manipulate social isolation recollections, we study whether social distancing has affected norms of prosociality and norm compliance. The normative expectations of what behaviors others would approve or disapprove in our experimental setting did not change. Looking at actual behavior, however, we find that persistent social distancing indeed caused a decline in prosociality —even after the relaxation of social distancing rules and in times of optimism. At the same time, our results contain some good news since subjects seem still to care for norms and become more prosocial once again after we draw their attention to the empirical norm of how others have previously behaved in a similar situation.

Parallel Session 6: Experimental Methods

Maximilian Späth

Testing the accuracy of the Becker-DeGroot-Marshak method: A note

The Becker-DeGroot-Marshak method is widely used to elicit the willingness to pay of individuals. Despite its solid theoretical foundation, the elicitation method's empirical accuracy is subject to debate. In this note, I analyze a simple check of the elicitation strategy: an auction for a known amount of money. I test the validity of the check by running a laboratory experiment with hypothetical outcomes. In support of the check, the results show a more accurately elicited willingness to pay, when the suggested reading time of the instructions is extended. This indicates that the check can be conducted during experimental pre-tests or as part of the pre-experimental control questions.

Claudia Biniossek, **Dirk Betz**, Martin Sterner, Timo Heinrich

How to choose a sample - A comparison of subject pools for economic online experiments

In past years, online recruiting services tailored to the needs of researchers have become commonly popular in experiments in economics and the social sciences. We conduct a market analysis of commonly used online recruitment tools that are basically suitable for executing online experiments in experimental economics. We investigate these platforms with regard to their key features, sampling methods, the quality curation of the participant pools, the methodological standards of experimental economic research, as well as costs, availability, and aspects of data protection. Critical points regarding these solutions like bots etc. will also be discussed. The analysis includes a comparison to the previous practice of computer laboratories at universities.

Parallel Session 6: Information Asymmetry

Ulrike Vollstaedt, Patrick Imcke, Franziska Brendel, Christiane Ehses-Friedrich

Increasing consumer surplus through a novel product testing mechanism

Our study examines information asymmetry about product quality between buyers and sellers, and we propose a novel mechanism to reduce this asymmetry in order to increase consumer surplus. While many buyers use online consumer ratings to obtain information, independent product testing organizations like Consumer Reports (US), Stiftung Warentest (Germany), and Which? (UK) seek to provide more precise and more credible information to buyers. However, limited testing capacity leads to product testing of only a select number of product models according to certain criteria, e.g., sales numbers, price, which may vary by product testing organization. Unfortunately, any of these current mechanisms can yield suboptimal information for buyers. In our study, we propose a novel, testing capacity-neutral mechanism to select product models for testing based on voluntary information disclosure. To analyze the performance of our proposed selection mechanism, we first develop a new game to derive theoretical, testable predictions. We show theoretically that a unique Nash equilibrium exists in which our mechanism leads to optimal information for buyers equivalent to a world of complete information. Therefore, it always outperforms current mechanisms except in two scenarios where it leads to the same consumer surplus, i.e., it weakly dominates current mechanisms. Subsequently, we use a lab setting to test these theoretical predictions and confirm experimentally that our new mechanism increases consumer surplus.

Nikolai Sachs, Daniel Schnurr

Privacy decision-making in digital markets: Eliciting individuals' preferences for transparency

Consumers often lack information about how online services collect, use and protect their data. Therefore, transparency is viewed as an essential prerequisite to support consumers in making informed privacy decisions. So far, the literature has primarily studied the consequences of transparency in different data disclosure contexts. However, whether and when individuals actually prefer transparency about privacy risks when given a chance to avoid it remains an open research question. Thus, we investigate individuals' choices between varying levels of transparency about uncertain losses of personal data. In a randomized controlled online experiment based on a between-subjects Ellsberg-type design, subjects repeatedly choose between a situation of risk, where a loss of personal data will occur with a known probability, and a situation of ambiguity, where a data loss will occur with an unknown probability. By eliciting subjects' revealed preferences in a controlled environment, we provide novel insights into why and when individuals may avoid transparency about privacy risks. In particular, we investigate whether subjects exhibit ambiguity aversion as found for uncertain monetary losses by previous studies. Moreover, we vary the general probability of a data loss in the experiment to analyze whether transparency preferences are contingent on the loss probability. Altogether, these insights contribute to a better understanding of whether individuals actually make use of transparency about privacy risks and thus shed light on firms' incentives to be transparent about their data use and the associated risks.

Parallel Session 7: Behavioural Finance

Charlotte Borsboom, **Sascha Füllbrunn**

Stock price level effect

Companies actively manipulate stock price ranges through IPOs, stock splits and repurchases. Indeed, empirical results suggest that the stock's price range, whether at a high or low price level, affect market performance. Unfortunately, archival data does not allow us to test the effect of stock price levels on investor behaviour due to uncontrolled confound effects. We thus conduct a controlled online experiment with 900 US retail investors to test whether a difference in stock price levels affects the investor's risk perception, the price forecast and the investment. Our results show significantly higher investments in high-priced stocks in comparison to low-priced stocks. This effect disappears when we allow fractional share purchases or restrict naive trading strategies.

Sebastian Krull, David Loschelder, **Matthias Pelster**

Social interactions and financial decision-making

The paper investigates the impact of social interactions and peer feedback on individuals' financial decision-making. Our papers aims to establish a general framework in line with the seminal Prospect Theory that expands the theory by explaining individuals' preferences within a social interactions' framework. We develop and test the hypothesis that social effects via social comparisons with peers alter the subjective perception of objectively identical gains and losses and, as a result, asymmetrically shift the value function of the Prospect Theory. Losses will be perceived as less negative if one's peers also suffer losses at the same time, while profits will be perceived as less positive if one's peers also realize profits. Similarly, losses will be perceived as more painful if one's peers realize gains and gains will be perceived as more positive if one's peers suffer simultaneous losses.

Henrike Sternberg, Janina Isabel Steinert, Sebastian Vollmer

On the basis of (mis)trust? Spousal trust and trustworthiness in household decision making: Experimental evidence from India

This paper examines the role of spousal trust in intra-household decision making through its potential of inciting the creation of information asymmetries in the presence of resource unobservability. We experimentally elicit spousal trust and trustworthiness by means of a binary trust game to assess heterogeneity in saving behavior among low-income slum dwellers in urban India. 360 married couples were randomly assigned to either a control group, receiving a shared saving device (a lockbox), or a treatment group, receiving a private saving device (a zip-purse) in addition to the lockbox. We find that the supplementary receipt of the private device significantly increased the wife's savings in couples with a low level of spousal trust. In couples with higher levels of trust, the effect coefficient turned negative. While this heterogeneity is driven by the wife's mistrust in absence of her husband's trustworthiness, we provide supportive evidence of an important channel being more effective hiding of the wife's savings amounts, facilitated through the private saving device. From a policy perspective, our findings have important implications for the design and evaluation of household-based (saving) interventions by offering a novel explanation for existing discrepancies between their observed and intended effects.

Parallel Session 7: Field Experiments & Selten's Horse

Vanessa Mertins, **Nicole Middendorf**

#30-Day Reading Challenge

Reading can only be learned through daily practice, but school practice time was in short supply in the Corona year 2020/21, with phases of school closures alternating with phases of school openings with a masking requirement or a ban on reading aloud. Many parents fear that this cohort started their school career with significant learning deficits, but hardly anyone really knows. Accordingly, the pressure to act and thus the motivation of parents to support their children's educational process through active participation is unclear. In a randomized controlled trial, we investigate the effects of systematically varied feedback on their children's reading skills on parents' motivation and effort to actively support skill acquisition over six weeks. Several hundred first graders train their reading skills with active support from their parents in a phonics reading tandem procedure as part of the nationwide "#30-Day Reading Challenge". The challenge is to motivate the parent-child tandems to achieve a consistently high or even increasing level of activity over the summer vacation, while strengthening the children's intrinsic motivation to such an extent that they remain active readers beyond the intervention period. In addition to parent performance, we also measure children's motivation and change in performance using validated literacy tests and weekly progress diagnostics.

Liza von Grafenstein, Sebastian Vollmer

Gender differences in parental investment decisions in rural India

We conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment with roughly 400 parent-child pairs in rural Bihar, India, a setting with strong son preference and reduced investments in the human capital of girls compared to boys. Children take two times a shortened version of the Raven's Colored Progressive Matrices test of cognitive development. The two rounds vary between a non-competitive setting with a piece-rate payment scheme depending on the child's own performance or a competitive setting with a contest-like payment scheme depending on the child's absolute and relative performance in a competition with another child. At the same time but at a different location, parents have to decide on how to spend their endowment of 100 INR on either the child's account that changes according to the payment scheme and the children's performance or an own account that is a guaranteed payout. Parents spend on average under non-competition 57 INR (95% CI: [55.07; 58.53]) on daughters and 56 INR (CI: [54.47; 58.27]) on sons and under competition 54 INR for each, daughters (95% CI: [52.61; 55.90]) and sons (95% CI: [51.67; 55.38]). In the competitive setting parents invest in their own child 56 INR (95% CI: [53.80; 57.91]) when the competitor is a child with unknown gender, 54 INR (95% CI: [51.42; 55.74]) when the competitor is a girl, and 52 INR (95% CI: [50.12; 54.47]) when the competitor is a boy. The results suggest that gender discrimination in human capital investments in the region is not related to parents perceptions of children's skills but rather has other reasons.

Tibor Neugebauer, Karim Sadrieh, Reinhard Selten

Taming Selten's Horse with Impulse Response

The paper experimentally examines the predictive power of the trembling hand perfect equilibrium concept in the three-player game Selten's Horse (Selten 1975). At first sight, our data show little support of the perfect equilibrium and rather favor the imperfect equilibrium. We introduce deterministic impulse response trajectories, which are remarkably close to the observed dynamics of the game. Since the impulse response trajectories converge on the perfect equilibrium, we tentatively conclude that the observed dynamics are in line with a convergence on the perfect equilibrium, but convergence takes time.

Parallel Session 7: Leadership

Sebastian Oelrich

Commitment as a double-edged sword: Organizational commitment influences norm effects on unethical behavior

Unethical behavior and misconduct in organizations continue to be challenging issues for organizations and wider society. Organizational behavior literature has identified social norms as significant factors in reducing unethical behavior and organizational commitment has been suggested as a way to reduce misconduct, although some caution that it may also foster unethical behavior through complicity. What has so far been neglected is if and how organizational commitment can affect the influence of different norms, i.e. descriptive, injunctive, and personal norms, on attitudes toward and unethical behaviors. Drawing on social influence, moral foundations and norm activation theory, we argue that organizational commitment can make some norms more salient, which reduces the influence of other norms. We conduct two field studies (N = 1195, N = 487) and one experiment (N = 163) which corroborate our hypotheses. High organizational commitment reduces co-workers' influence, who usually serve as a reference point for behavior, whereas ethical leadership by superiors becomes more relevant (study 1). Such commitment can also reduce the importance of societal norms on attitude towards unethical behavior (study 2) and even suppress personal norm influences on unethical behavior (study 3). As this effect has multiple implications, not only reducing problematic influences, but also norms that otherwise would keep employees from engaging in unethical behavior, we conclude that organizational commitment can be a double-edged sword.

Özgür Gürerk, Thomas Lauer, Martin Scheuermann

Leader legitimacy and team performance

Research has identified (exogenous) appointment and (endogenous) election as two crucial sources of leader legitimacy. Through a series of controlled lab experiments, we investigate the causal effect of these two sources on team performance. In our experiments, subjects first play an economic game simulating a leader-free teamwork situation. In the subsequent experimental phase, one member of the team is assigned to the role of the leader. Depending on the experimental treatment, the leader is either appointed exogenously or gets elected endogenously. In this phase, teams play an economic game in a "leading by example" setting, i.e., leaders act first, other team members follow. We have two main results. First, teams with leaders exert higher efforts towards the accomplishment of a team project than leader-free teams did before. Second, compared to the leader-free situation, the relative performance increase is higher in teams with elected leaders than with appointed ones. Additional treatments show that information about a leader's past behaviors reinforces the positive effect of leader legitimacy on team performance.

Lucas Braun, Christine Harbring

Real-time monitoring at the workplace

With the shift to highly connected computer workspaces in today's work environments, Orwellian surveillance strategies are technically feasible. Being confronted with a considerable increase in work-from-home practices employers may decide to take measures to monitor the productivity of employees, e.g., via tracking network traffic, checking on work intensity or utilization of remote desktop monitoring software. We conduct a principal-agent online experiment to investigate how real-time software monitoring impacts productivity, stress and satisfaction of agents. Participants work on a real-effort slider task in groups of four with or without real-time monitoring by a principal, who watches simultaneous representations of all four agents' work effort, instantly vindicating all changes to sliders and usage of break times. We examine changes to performance in the real-effort task as well as usage of breaks as a reaction to being monitored.

Parallel Session 7: Norms & Biases

Ivo Windrich, **Sabrina Kierspel**, Thomas Neumann, Roger Berger, Bodo Vogt

The impact of norms and losses in dictator games

The division of different sorts of losses (e.g. health, economic resources, etc.) during the Corona crisis shows that fairness norms in situations of losses are a relevant topic for social research. Therefore, we conducted dictator game experiments in gains and loss situations with n= 550 subjects. In the negative dictator games, subjects had to share a loss of -€10 with an anonymous partner. First, we compared the giving in the dictator game over losses with the giving in the dictator game over gains. Next, we applied norm focus treatments to test the impact of a newly given descriptive norm and the robustness of the fairness norms in these two situations. We found (1) a significant difference in giving behavior between gain and loss treatments, (2) only minor effects of the descriptive norm on decisions, and (3) fairness norms to be robust against focusing subjects on the game theoretic solution of the game. In further explorative analyses we found that our treatments had interaction effects with the scientific background of participants when it came to giving behavior.

Dmitri Bershadskyy

Big effects require big causes – Testing proportionality bias in the lab

In a preregistered study we examine experimentally whether subjects fall for the proportionality bias, which describes human tendency to assume that big effects must have had big causes. This bias potentially contributes to emergence of conspiracy theories. To analyze it in a controlled environment we propose an experimental setup – conspiracy game – which simulates several aspects of conspiracies. The game analyzes whether subjects change their attribution of causality between chance (small cause) und malevolent human agency (big cause) depending on the size of the outcome, which is otherwise uninformative.

Lisa Bruttel, **Niklas Ziemann**

How do people discount over spatial distance?

This paper studies how individuals discount the utility derived from goods that are provided in spatial distance to them. In a controlled laboratory experiment, we elicit preferences for the provision of the same good at different locations. To isolate spatial preferences from any other direct value of the goods being close to the individual, we focus on ''existence value'' goods. We find that individuals put a special weight on the provision of these goods in their immediate vicinity. This ''vicinity bias'' represents a spatial analogy to the ''present bias'' from the time dimension. Practically, it is associated with an inefficient provision of goods. Interestingly, when the immediate vicinity is not involved in the decision, individuals do not differentiate between more and less distant locations anymore.

Platz für Notizen

Teilnehmerliste

Vorname	Nachname	E-Mail
Peter	Andre	p.andre@uni-bonn.de
Regina	Anselm	regina.anselm@uni-konstanz.de
Paul	Bengart	paul.bengart@med.ovgu.de
Dmitri	Bershadskyy	dmitri.bershadskyy@ovgu.de
Dirk	Betz	dirk.betz@uni-erfurt.de
Claudia	Biniossek	claudia.biniossek@uni-erfurt.de
Olaf	Bock	olaf.bock@uni-hamburg.de
Lucas	Braun	lucas.braun@rwth-aachen.de
Vivien	Breitrück	vivien.breitrueck@uni-vechta.de
Jeannette	Brosig-Koch	jeannette.brosig-koch@ovgu.de
Janis	Cloos	janis.cloos@tu-clausthal.de
Astrid	Dannenberg	dannenberg@uni-kassel.de
René	Degenkolbe	rene.degenkolbe@ovgu.de
Christoph	Drobner	christoph.drobner@tum.de
René	Fahr	rene.fahr@upb.de
Ibrahim	Filiz	ibrahim.filiz@ostfalia.de
Martin	Fochmann	martin.fochmann@fu-berlin.de
Björn	Frank	frank@uni-kassel.de
Sascha	Füllbrunn	sascha.fullbrunn@ru.nl
Marcus	Giamattei	m.giamattei@berlin.bard.edu
Johann	Graf Lambsdorff	jlambsd@uni-passau.de
Jannik	Greif	jannik.greif@ovgu.de
Matthias	Greiff	matthias.greiff@tu-clausthal.de
Anke	Greif-Winzrieth	anke.greif-winzrieth@kit.edu
Max	Grossmann	m.grossmann@uni-koeln.de
Kevin	Grubiak	kevin.grubiak@uni-passau.de
Susanna	Grundmann	susanna.grundmann@uni-koeln.de
Özgür	Gürerk	guererk@uni-erfurt.de
Franziska	Heinicke	franziheinicke@gmail.com
Timo	Heinrich	timo.heinrich@tuhh.de
Heike	Hennig-Schmidt	hschmidt@uni-bonn.de
Maximilian	Hiller	Maximilian.Hiller@uni-vechta.de

Vorname	Nachname	E-Mail
Sven	Hoeppner	hoeppnes@prf.cuni.cz
Elisa	Hofmann	elisa.hofmann@uni-jena.de
Bernd	Irlenbusch	bernd.irlenbusch@uni-koeln.de
Sabrina	Jeworrek	sabrina.jeworrek@iwh-halle.de
Jan	Judek	janrene.judek@stud.uni-goettingen.de
Claudia	Keser	claudia.keser@uni-goettingen.de
Ann-Katrin	Kienle	ann-katrin.kienle@fhgr.ch
Sabrina	Kierspel	sabrina.kierspel@ovgu.de
Dirk	Kiesewetter	dirk.kiesewetter@uni-wuerzburg.de
Janina	Kleinknecht	janina.kleinknecht@uni-ulm.de
Stefan	Klößner	stefan.kloessner@uni-vechta.de
Martin	Kocher	martin.kocher@univie.ac.at
Felix	Kölle	felix.koelle@uni-koeln.de
Manfred	Königstein	manfred.koenigstein@uni-erfurt.de
Kai	Konrad	Kai.Konrad@tax.mpg.de
Janina	Kraus	krausj@hsu-hh.de
Jan-Philipp	Krügel	kruegel@hsu-hh.de
Anna-Corinna	Kulle	anna-corinna.kulle@iop.unibe.ch
David	Kusterer	kusterer@uni-koeln.de
Devin	Kwasniok	Devin.Kwasniok@uni-vechta.de
Thomas	Lauer	thomas.lauer@uni-erfurt.de
Bernd Josef	Leisen	bernd.josef.leisen@uni-vechta.de
Marco	Lorenz	marco.lorenz@stud.uni-goettingen.de
Markus	Lüttenberg	markus.luettenberg@kit.edu
André	Machwart	andre.machwart@uni-wuerzburg.de
Christine	Meemann	meemannc@hsu-hh.de
Vanessa	Mertins	vanessa.mertins@uni-vechta.de
Monique	Meyer	monique.meyer2@fu-berlin.de
Nicole	Middendorf	nicole.middendorf@uni-vechta.de
Wladislaw	Mill	wmill@web.de
Kerstin	Mitterbacher	kerstin.mitterbacher@uni-graz.at
Jan	Müller-Dethard	jamuelle@mail.uni-mannheim.de

Vorname	Nachname	E-Mail
Heinrich	Nax	hnax@ethz.ch
Max-Frederik	Neubert	max-frederik.neubert@ovgu.de
Tibor	Neugebauer	Tibor.Neugebauer@uni.lu
Thomas	Neumann	t.neumann@ovgu.de
Sebastian	Oelrich	sebastian.oelrich@ovgu.de
Maxim	Ott	maxim.ott@gmx.de
Fabian	Paetzel	fpaetzel@hsu-hh.de
Matthias	Pelster	matthias.pelster@upb.de
Timo	Promann	timo.promann@uni-hamburg.de
Hannes	Rau	hannes.rau@kit.edu
Till	Requate	requate@economics.uni-kiel.de
Bettina	Rockenbach	bettina.rockenbach@uni-koeln.de
Nathalie	Römer	roemer@wipol.uni-hannover.de
Nikolai	Sachs	nikolai.sachs@uni-passau.de
Florian	Sachs	florian.sachs@tum.de
Abdolkarim	Sadrieh	sadrieh@ovgu.de
Marina	Schröder	schroeder@wipol.uni-hannover.de
Willem	Schuchardt	willem.schuchardt@ovgu.de
Michael	Seebauer	michael.seebauer@fau.de
Alexandra	Seidel	alexandra.seidel@ovgu.de
Tassilo	Sobotta	tassilo.sobotta@wiwi.uni-halle.de
Mey-Ling	Sommer	sommerme@hsu-hh.de
Maximilian	Späth	maximilian.spaeth@uni-potsdam.de
Henrike	Sternberg	henrike.sternberg@tum.de
Martin	Sterner	martin.sterner@tuhh.de
Cornelia	Strauss	cornelia.strauss@wi.jlug.de
Bodo	Sturm	bodo.sturm@htwk-leipzig.de
Blanca	Tena Estrada	blanca.tena@uni-kassel.de
Katja	Tilkes	rebecca.tilkes@hrm.rwth-aachen.de
Stefan	Traub	traubs@hsu-hh.de
Sebastian	Vollmer	svollmer@uni-goettingen.de
Ulrike	Vollstaedt	ulrikevollstaedt@web.de
Liza	von Grafenstein	liza.grafenstein@uni-goettingen.de

Vorname	Nachname	E-Mail
Aline	Waeber	aline.waeber@unisg.ch
Joschka	Waibel	joschka.waibel@iwh-halle.de
Joachim	Weimann	Joachim.Weimann@ovgu.de
Eva	Weingärtner	eva.weingaertner@uni-kassel.de
Katharina	Werner	katharina.werner@uni-passau.de
Madeline	Werthschulte	werthschulte@zew.de
Irenaeus	Wolff	irenaeus.wolff@uni.kn
Niklas	Ziemann	niklas.ziemann@uni-potsdam.de

Lageplan & Anfahrt

Festung Mark
Hohepfortewall 1
39104 Magdeburg
Zugang über Brücke

Straßenbahn

Mit den öffentlichen Verkehrsmitteln erreichen Sie die Festung Mark über die Haltestellen Listemannstraße oder die Haltestelle Opernhaus.



Lageplan & Anfahrt

Quelle: Festung Mark Magdeburg

Anfahrt

Straßenbahn zur Festung Mark ab:

Dorint Herrenkrug Parkhotel
Einstieg Haltestelle: Herrenkrug (Tram), Tram 6 (Richtung: Diesdorf), alle 15 min
Ausstieg Haltestelle: Listemannstraße
Fahrzeit: etwa 11 min

Motel One
Einstieg Haltestelle: Domplatz, Tram 2 (Richtung: Alte Neustadt), alle 15 min
Ausstieg Haltestelle: Listemannstraße
Fahrzeit: etwa 9 min

artHOTEL
Einstieg Haltestelle: Leiterstraße, Tram 2 (Richtung: Alte Neustadt), alle 15 min
Ausstieg Haltestelle: Listemannstraße
Fahrzeit: etwa 8 min

ibis Styles
Einstieg Haltestelle: Alter Markt, Tram 6 (Richtung: Herrenkrug) oder Tram 2 (Richtung: Alte Neustadt), jeweils alle 15 min
Ausstieg Haltestelle: Listemannstraße
Fahrzeit: etwa 4 min

Lageplan & Anfahrt

Anfahrt Konferenzdinner

Dorint Herrenkrug Parkhotel

Herrenkrug 3

39114 Magdeburg

Quelle: Dorint Parkhotel Magdeburg

Straßenbahn zum Dorint Herrenkrug Parkhotel ab Festung Mark:

Einstieg Haltestelle: Listemannstraße, Tram 6 (Richtung: Herrenkrug), alle 15 min
Ausstieg Haltestelle: Herrenkrug (Tram)
Fahrzeit: etwa 11 min

Ab Haltestelle Herrenkrug (Tram) 2-minütiger Fußweg